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1. Introduction 
The survival of the eurozone hinges on the capacity of 
its leaders to improve its governance. This has become 
very clear since the eruption of the government debt 
crisis in the eurozone in 2009, which can be said to 
result from a failure of economic governance. In order 
to answer the question of how the economic 
governance of the eurozone should be reformed, we 
should first make a diagnosis of the crisis in which the 
eurozone has been mired since 2009.  
2.  Diagnosis of the crisis 
A consensus seems to emerging in Europe identifying 
the failure of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to 
keep a lid on national budget deficits and debts as the 
root cause of the government debt crises in the 
eurozone. I would argue to the contrary, however, that 
the reason why countries got into a sovereign debt 
crisis – with the exception of Greece – has little to do 
with the poor performance of the SGP. The root cause 
of the debt problems in the eurozone is to be found in 
the unsustainable debt accumulation of the private 
sectors in many eurozone countries (see the evidence 
presented in Figures 1 and 2). It can be seen that 
household and bank debt were increasing very fast 
prior to the debt crisis. Surprisingly, the only sector 
that did not experience an increase in its debt level (as 
a % of GDP) was the government sector.  
The private debt accumulation in the eurozone then 
triggered the well-known debt deflation dynamics 
(analysed by Irving Fisher, 1933) and later by Minsky 
(1986), forcing the governments of the eurozone 
countries to allow their own debt levels to increase. 
This was achieved through two channels: the first one 
consisted of governments actually taking over private 
debt (mostly bank debt), and the second one operated 
through the automatic stabilisers set in motion by the 
recession-induced decline in government revenues. As 
a result, the government debt/GDI ratio started 
increasing very fast after the eruption of the financial 
crisis. In Figure 3, we show the government debt to 
GDP ratios before and after the crisis for the eurozone 
countries. The most surprising feature of figure is that 
except for Germany and Portugal, the government debt 
ratios of the other eurozone countries were all 
declining prior to 2008. Even more striking is to find 
that in two countries that have experienced severe 
government debt problems recently, Ireland and Spain, 
the government debt ratios were declining 
spectacularly prior to the crisis. These were also the 
countries where the private debt accumulation has 
been the strongest.  
From this evidence it is clear that it is difficult to 
maintain that the cause of the government debt crisis in 
the eurozone is due to government profligacy prior to 
the crisis. The only country where this can be said to 
be true is Greece. It does not apply to the other 
countries, where the fundamental cause of the crisis is 
to be found in unsustainable private debt accumulation 
forcing governments to step in to help out (in some 
cases to save) large segments of the private sector.  
Although the cause of the government debt crisis does 
not reside in the poor workings of the SGP, it remains 
true that the latter does not work well. This was shown 
dramatically in 2003 when France and Germany 
decided to waive the SGP rules unilaterally. It is 
therefore important to understand why the SGP does 
not work well before we decide to tighten its rules and 
to impose more sanctions, or before we try to apply its 
method to other areas of national economic policies.  
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Figure 1. Household and government liabilities in eurozone (% of GDP) 
 




Figure 2. Bank and corporate liabilities in the eurozone (% of GDP) 
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Figure 3. Government debt in the eurozone countries (% of GDP) 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO database. 
 
The reason why the SGP worked poorly can be 
described as follows. As long as budgetary policies 
(spending and taxation) remain vested in the hands of 
national governments and parliaments, the political 
responsibility for the decisions about spending and 
taxation rests with these national governments and 
parliaments. The latter face the political sanctions by 
national electorates. Neither the European Commission 
nor the other members of the Council face the political 
sanction for the measures they impose on one member 
country. “No taxation without representation” belongs 
to the essence of democracies. The SGP has been an 
attempt to short-circuit this principle, by giving powers 
to individuals and institutions that do not face the 
political responsibility for their actions. Such an 
attempt had to fail and happily so.  
The Commission has proposed to tighten the rules and 
to apply stiffer sanctions in the SGP. It looks 
increasingly likely that the Task Force on Economic 
Governance presided over by the President of the 
European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, will propose 
a similar tightening of the SGP rules. It is unclear how 
stiffer rules and sanctions will help to salvage the SGP 
that is deeply flawed because it disregards elementary 
principles of political economy.  
The previous analysis leads to the following two 
conclusions. First, the crisis in the eurozone has mostly 
to do with the divergent developments in private debt. 
The latter have much to do with macroeconomic 
divergences in general. So, something must be done 
about these divergences. But what exactly? 
Second, the method of convergence implicit in the 
SGP should not be the model to impose convergence 
in other areas of national economic policies. This 
method has not worked well in the budgetary field; it is 
unlikely to do so in other fields. 
3.  How to deal with macroeconomic 
divergences?  
Here also we need the right diagnosis. Where do these 
macroeconomic divergences come from? I think we do 
not have a very good answer today. We do not 
understand very well how these macroeconomic 
divergences in the eurozone come about.  
It is often said that the source of the boom-and-bust 
dynamics in countries like Spain, Greece and Ireland is 
due to the fact that these countries enjoyed a strong 
decline in their real interest rate thanks to their entry 
into the eurozone. This decline in the real interest rates 
then triggered a boom in consumption and a bubble in 
the housing markets. Fair enough, but this does not 
explain everything. Italy similarly enjoyed an 
unprecedented decline in its real interest rate when it 
entered the eurozone, yet it did not experience a boom 
and a bubble.  
This leads me to bring in another explanatory variable: 
animal spirits, i.e. waves of optimism and pessimism 
that in a self-fulfilling way drive economic activity 
(see Akerlof & Shiller, 2009; Leijonhufvud, 1973 and 
Minsky, 1986). My hypothesis is that as far as animal 
spirits are concerned, the eurozone is far from being 
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‘angst’ prevailed in Germany while bursts of optimism 
exploded in Spain and Ireland. Today optimism drives 
the German recovery and pessimism prevails in the 
once-booming countries. Thus, member states of the 
eurozone are still very much independent nations 
creating their own animal spirits.  
The existence of idiosyncratic animal spirits is at the 
core of the divergences in competitiveness observed 
during the last decade. The optimism prevailing in 
peripheral countries led to booms in economic 
activities which in turn triggered wage and price 
increases in these countries. A few years of such 
booming activity was enough to push prices and wage 
costs out of line with the rest of the eurozone, as is 
shown in Figure 4, which presents the evolution of the 
relative unit labour costs in the eurozone since 1999.  
 
Figure 4. Relative unit labour costs in eurozone (average 1970-2010 = 100) 
 
Note: In this figure, the author takes the average of the relative unit labour costs over the period 1970-2010 to be a close 
approximation of the equilibrium values and sets this average equal to 100. The divergent movements in unit labour costs are 
less pronounced than when 1999 is selected. Nevertheless, there is upward divergence in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy and 
until 2008, also in Ireland.  
Source: European Commission, AMECO database. 
 
There is a tendency in Europe to blame ‘structural 
rigidities’ for the divergent movements in 
competitiveness in the eurozone, and that thus 
‘structural reforms’ should be instituted. While 
undoubtedly the European Union exhibits much 
rigidity, this probably has little to do with the divergent 
movements in competitiveness, as shown in Figure 5. 
This presents the OECD index of employment 
protection (on the horizontal axis) and relative change 
in unit labour costs from 1999 to 2010 (on the vertical 
axis). It can be seen that there is no relationship 
between the OECD index of rigidities in the labour 
markets of the eurozone countries and the changes in 




Structural reforms are therefore not the answer to 
divergences in competitiveness. The latter are better 
explained by divergent movements in macroeconomic 
conditions
1 that in turn are very much influenced by 
national animal spirits. It is therefore surprising to find 
that the European Commission considers sanctioning 
countries that do not introduce structural reforms to 
improve their competitive position. There is simply no 
evidence that introducing structural reforms in the 
labour markets will improve the competitiveness of 
countries.  
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Figure 5. Change in unit labour costs and employment protection 
 
Sources: OECD for Employment Protection index and AMECO for ULC. 
 
If booms and busts and the ensuing movements in 
prices and wages are the results of animal spirits that 
continue to have a national, not European origin, what 
can one do about it? Put differently, do national 
governments have the tools to deal with this? 
They surely have some at their disposal. Budget 
policies for example can in principle be used as an 
anti-cyclical instrument. The use of these policies, 
however, is very much constrained, mainly because the 
decision-making process underlying these policies 
makes them less than flexible instruments. 
There is another aspect that tends to reduce the 
capacity of national governments to deal with local 
booms and busts. Booms and bubbles are most often 
correlated with domestic credit expansion. This is 
shown vividly in Figure 6 on page 6 for industrial 
countries. It is the combination of bubbles (especially 
in the housing markets) and credit expansion that 
makes bubbles potentially lethal. This has been made 
very clear by the experience of Spain and Ireland.  
Thus, any policy aimed at stabilising local economic 
activity must also be able to control local credit 
creation. It is clear that because the member states of 
the eurozone have entered a monetary union they lack 
the instruments to deal with this. Put differently, if the 
movements of economic activity are driven by credit-
fuelled animal spirits, the only instruments that can 
effectively deal with their behaviour are monetary 
instruments. Members of a monetary union, however, 
have relinquished these instruments to the European 
monetary authorities.  
The next question then becomes: can the European 
monetary authorities, in particular the European 
Central Bank (ECB), help out national governments? 
We have been told that this is impossible because the 
ECB should only be concerned by system-wide 
aggregates. It cannot be made responsible for national 
economic conditions. The reason is that it has one 
objective, namely the maintenance of price stability in 
the eurozone as a whole, and because it has only one 
instrument to achieve this goal. 
This I believe is too cheap an answer. The ECB is not 
only responsible for price stability but also for 
financial stability. The financial crisis that erupted in 
the eurozone last year clearly had its origin in a limited 
number of countries. It is therefore important that the 
ECB focuses not only on system-wide aggregates but 
also on what happens in individual countries. 
Excessive bank credit creation in a number of member 
countries should also appear on the radar screens of the 
ECB in Frankfurt and that institution should take 
action accordingly.  
One may object that the ECB does not have the 
instruments to deal with excessive bank credit in parts 
of the eurozone. This, however, is not so. The 
Eurosystem has the technical ability to restrict bank 
credit in some countries more than in others by 
applying differential minimum reserve requirements, 
or by imposing anti-cyclical capital ratios. These can 
and should be used as stabilising instruments at the 
national level.  
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Figure 6. Real house prices and growth rate of nominal credit relative to GDP (percent) 
 
Source: Kannan et al. (2009). 
 
Another objection is that it is the responsibility of the 
financial supervisors to deal with excessive risk-taking 
by banks. When banks extend too much credit and 
thereby increase the risk of their balance sheets, 
national supervisors should intervene. This is 
undoubtedly so. At the same time it does not absolve 
the Eurosystem from its responsibility to maintain 
financial stability. When a credit-fuelled boom 
emerges in some member states, it is also the 
responsibility of the Eurosystem to act. The 
Eurosystem also has the most powerful toolkit for 
controlling the macroeconomic consequences of 
booms and busts.  
The recent reforms in the supervisory landscape in the 
eurozone increase the scope for action by the 
Eurosystem. As will be recalled, the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has now been created, 
which will be presided over, very pointedly, by the 
President of the ECB. Thus the creators of the ESRB 
have clearly understood that the ECB lies at the centre 
of the monitoring of emerging systemic risks in the 
eurozone. It would be highly paradoxical for the 
President of the ESRB (ECB) to sound warning signals 
about systemic risk and then not follow-up this 
warning by action to reduce the risks, leaving it to the 
national supervisors to act alone.  
4. Conclusion 
Much of the discussion about how to impose more 
convergence among member states of the eurozone has 
focused on what national governments should do to 
avoid divergent developments in a number of 
macroeconomic variables (competitiveness, current 
account imbalances). Without denying that national 
governments bear part of the responsibility, the role of 
these governments has been over-emphasised. 
Conversely the role of the monetary authorities, in 
particular the ECB, has been under-emphasised.  
This conclusion is based on my diagnosis of the causes 
of the present crisis, namely that the divergences 
between member states of the eurozone have been 
driven mainly by ‘national animal spirits’, i.e. waves 
of optimism and pessimism that continue to have a 
strong national basis in the eurozone. There are as yet 
no animal spirits gripping the eurozone as a whole. 
These national animal spirits endogenously trigger 
credit expansion and contraction. It is this link between 
credit and animal spirits that make the latter so 
powerful in shaping movements in output and 
investment. It follows that the key to the control of the 
national divergences in macroeconomic variables lies 
in the control over the movements of credit at the 
national level. The key institutions in the eurozone that 
can influence national credit movements are the 
monetary authorities, including the ECB.  
The official EU-proposals (from the European 
Commission and the Task Force on Economic 
Governance) to deal with national divergences in the 
eurozone should therefore not concentrate almost 
exclusively on what governments of the member-states 
should do, but also on the responsibilities of the 
eurozone monetary authorities. Some hard thinking 
about the role of these monetary authorities will be 
necessary to come to grips with endemic 
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Finally we also stressed that the European 
Commission’s proposals to strengthen the Stability and 
Growth Pact by adding more sanctions is ill conceived. 
The fundamental cause of the debt crisis in the 
eurozone is to be found in the unsustainable expansion 
of private debt prior to the crisis. The strong expansion 
of government debt levels in the eurozone started after 
the financial crisis erupted and it was necessary first to 
save large parts of the private sector and second to 
prevent a downward spiral in economic activity. The 
Commission’s proposals suggest that future 
governments that intervene to save the private sector 
should be punished for such wickedness.  
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